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Abstract
We find that the Friedman rule is not optimal with government transfers and dis-
tortionary taxation. This result holds for heterogeneous agents, standard homogeneous
preferences, and constant returns to scale production functions. The presence of transfers
changes the standard optimal taxation result of uniform taxation. As transfers cannot be
taxed, a positive nominal net interest rate is the indirect way to tax the additional income
derived from transfers. The higher the transfers, the higher is the optimal inflation rate.
We calibrate a model with transfers to the US economy and obtain optimal values for
inflation substantially above the Friedman rule.
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1 Introduction
Friedman (1968) shows that a policy rule of zero nominal interest rate maximizes welfare.
This policy rule is known as the Friedman rule. A zero nominal interest rate corresponds to a
zero inflation tax and to a negative rate of inflation. This policy implies setting the price of
obtaining real balances equal to zero, which is approximately equal to its production cost. As
the marginal cost of supplying money is negligible, and the marginal benefit should be equal
to the marginal cost to maximize welfare, then the nominal interest rate should be set to zero.
Phelps (1973) challenged the relevance of the result in Friedman (1968). According to
Phelps, money should be taxed as any other good, taking into account its relative elasticity,
if government expenditures must be financed with distortionary taxes. Following Ramsey
(1927), the optimum taxation problem is the one of financing a given level of government
expenditures that implies the minimum decrease in welfare. Taxes should then be set so that
the marginal distortion caused by one unit of revenue collected with one tax is equalized
across the different taxes. The standard implication applied to a monetary economy is that
the optimal inflation tax would imply a strictly positive nominal interest rate.
It turns out that, when all sources of income can be taxed, the generalized use of the
Ramsey policy to justify the Phelps result does not hold (see, among others, Kimbrough
1986, Correia and Teles 1999, Cunha 2008, and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2011). Atkinson
and Stiglitz (1972) establish that it is optimal not to distort the relative prices of different
consumption goods when preferences are separable in leisure and homothetic in consumption
goods. These rules were applied to the cash-credit goods economies by Lucas and Stokey
(1983) and Chari et al. (1996) to study the optimal inflation tax. In these models, the inflation
tax turns into an effective tax on cash goods. Following the result on uniform taxation of
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972), the Friedman rule is optimal. Moreover, consumption and labor
income taxes are perfect substitutes. Optimal taxation is obtained by having zero seigniorage
and taxing either labor income or consumption.
However, the Friedman rule might not be optimal when the tax system is not complete,
according to the definition of Chari and Kehoe (1999). When the government is unable to
tax all sources of income, positive inflation may be a desirable instrument to tax the part of
income that cannot be taxed. As all types of private income are devoted to consumption at
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some point, and because inflation acts as a tax on consumption, a positive nominal interest
rate represents an indirect way to tax all sources of income. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004)
consider the case when firms make profits that cannot be taxed. Nicolini (1998), Cavalcanti
and Villamil (2001), and Arbex (2013), consider the presence of an informal sector where
agents can evade taxes.
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2011) calibrate three different models, each with a source of
income that cannot be taxed to the US economy. They consider a model with decreasing
returns to scale, another with monopolistic competition, and an underground economy in
which firms can evade income taxes. They find that untaxed income alone cannot explain why
the Federal Reserve and other monetary authorities follow an explicit or implicit inflation
target of two percent per year, since the models with these frictions imply an optimal rate of
inflation that is insignificantly above zero.
Here, we study the optimal monetary policy in the presence of transfers. Transfers
are payments to economic agents that are not associated with any exchange of goods or
services. Transfers can be payments such as social security, pensions, scholarships, financial
aid, medicare, and subsidies. One of the main objectives of these transfers is to redistribute
income from the richer to the poorer, and us such they are not taxed. They are substantial in
all developed countries. In the US, government transfers payments increased from 4.6 percent
of GDP in 1947 to 15 percent in 2016. Considering only federal transfers of social benefits
to persons (the main component of transfers), the increase in the same period was from 3.2
percent of GDP to 10.8 percent.
In the presence of transfers, we show that the optimal tax policy changes significantly.
Uniform taxation is not optimal and the efficient inflation tax is positive. In our calibration
of the model to the US, we obtain optimal inflation rates that are significantly above zero.
When transfers as a percentage of GDP are 10 percent, the optimal inflation rate is about 6
percent. Thus, a higher target for the inflation than the one followed by the generality of the
central banks in the world, is warranted given the existence of transfers.
Moreover, we find that the equivalency between the tax instruments depends on the way in
which transfers are introduced. We show this in a simple cash in advance economy with only
a cash good. The tax on consumption and the tax on labor income are perfect substitutes if
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the transfers, adjusted for the price gross of all taxes (including the nominal interest rate),
are constant. Instead, if the path of transfers is constant, adjusted only for the price, then the
optimal labor income tax is zero. In this case, the nominal interest rate and the consumption
tax are perfect substitutes. The Friedman rule is optimal in this case, but there are other
optimal policies that involve positive seigniorage.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 considers a model with heterogeneous
households. Heterogeneous agents provides a justification for government transfers. Transfers
are introduce as an instrument to reduce inequality. An economy with a cash good and a
credit good is considered and we show that uniform taxation is not optimal. In section 3, we
calibrate a simplified version of the model to the US and obtain an estimate of the optimal
inflation rate. In section 4, we consider a version of the model with a cash good only. We show
that the optimal tax policy changes with the particular way in which transfers are introduced.
Section 5 states the main conclusions.
2 The Model
Consider an economy with heterogeneous households and two types of consumption goods:
a cash good and a credit good. Each household makes decisions on consumption and labor,
and cash is required to purchase the cash good. Households have measure 1, are uniformly
distributed over [0, 1], and are indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. As in Correia (2010), households are
different in two dimensions: the efficiency level ei and the initial wealth Wi0. The efficiency
level affects the result of labor in the following way: lit hours of work imply eilit units of
efficiency.1 Labor income depends on the efficiency units. The productivity, or real wage,
for each unit of eilit is normalized to one. Time is discrete, t = 0, 1, 2, ... There is a constant
returns to scale technology that transforms units of efficiency into output. The output can be
used for private consumption of cash goods c1it, credit goods c2it, and public consumption gt.
The resource constraint is
∫ 1
0
(c1it + c2it) di+ gt =
∫ 1
0
eili,tdi. (1)
1Different levels of efficiency and of initial wealth are two ways of introducing inequality in the model. See
Castaneda et al. (2003) and Diaz-Gimenez et al. (2011) for a discussion on inequality and the distribution of
wealth, earnings, and income.
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The utility function of household i is
∞∑
t=0
βtU(c1it, c2it, 1− lit), (2)
0 < β < 1, where the utility function U is strictly concave, satisfies the Inada conditions, is
additively separable in leisure and homogeneous in consumption.
Households trade money, bonds, and goods in markets that obey the Lucas and Stokey
(1983) timing. At the beginning of period t they trade money and bonds in a centralized
market. After this trading, the household splits into a shopper and a worker. The shopper
uses money to buy the cash good and to purchase the credit good, the shopper issues nominal
claims, which are settled in the assets markets at the beginning of period t+ 1. The worker is
paid in cash at the end of period t.
The budget constraint of each household for the asset market at the beginning of period 0
is given by
Mi0 +Bi0 ≤Wi0, (3)
and, at the beginning of period t, it is given by
Mit +Bit ≤ pt−1(1− τt−1)eilit−1 − pt−1 (1 + τ1t−1) c1it−1 (4)
−pt−1 (1 + τ2t−1) c2it−1 +Rt−1Bit−1 +Mit−1 + Zit−1,
t ≥ 1, where Mit and Bit denote the stocks of money and bonds, pt denotes the price level, Rt
denotes the gross nominal interest rate, τ1t and τ2t denote the consumption tax rate on the
cash good and on the credit good, respectively, τt denotes the tax rate on the labor income,
and Zit denotes the transfer.2 The initial wealth Wi0 is exogenous. There is also a no-Ponzi
condition
lim
t→∞Qt (Mit +Bit) ≥ 0, (5)
where Qt ≡ ∏t−1k=0R−1k , Q0 ≡ 1, is the price at 0 of a bond that pays 1 dollar at t.
2In this framework, where agents are heterogeneous, positive transfers from the government have the
potential to reduce the inequality across households.
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The cash-in-advance constraint is given by
pt (1 + τ1t) c1it ≤Mit, (6)
for t ≥ 0. Without loss of generality, we assume throughout that the cash in advance restriction
holds with equality.3
The period t government budget constraint is
Rt
∫ 1
0
Bitdi+
∫ 1
0
Zitdi+ ptgt = ptτ1t
∫ 1
0
c1itdi+ ptτ2t
∫ 1
0
c2itdi (7)
+ptτt
∫ 1
0
eilitdi+
∫ 1
0
Bit+1di+
∫ 1
0
Mit+1di−
∫ 1
0
Mitdi,
for t ≥ 0. The terms on the left hand side of (7) are outflows and the terms on the right hand
side of (7) are inflows. The government must charge the same tax rate to each household, but
it can discriminate the transfers across households. The government policy on taxes is given
by ut ≡ (τt, τ1t, τ2t).
Let xit ≡ (c1it, c2it, lit,Mit, Bit) denote allocations for households i ∈ [0, 1] and let vt ≡
(pt, Rt) denote a price system for the economy. The problem of household i is to choose an
allocation xit that maximizes (2) given taxes ut, prices vt, transfers Zit, and initial wealth
Wi0, and the constraints (3), (4) and (6). We define a competitive equilibrium an allocation
(xit)∞i=1, a price system vt and a policy ut such that: (i) each allocation xit solves the problem
of household i given the price system, the government policy and the transfers, i ∈ [0, 1]; and
(ii) the resource constraint (1) is satisfied.
A Ramsey problem is defined as an allocation, a set of prices and policy variables such
that welfare is maximized and the allocation can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium
with those prices and policy variables. In the context of the model, the Ramsey problem
consists in choosing the paths of the nominal interest rate, the consumption tax rates, and the
labor income tax rate, that implement the competitive equilibrium allocation and that yield
the highest level of welfare to households. We say that the government follows an optimal
policy if the policy solves the Ramsey problem.
We follow the primal approach to obtain the Ramsey allocation and policy variables.
3That will happen if R > 1.
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According to this approach, the government maximizes welfare by choosing directly the
allocations of households, taking into account the resource constraint of the economy, and
the fact that households react to the tax rates. As in Lucas and Stokey (1983), we solve the
problem in two steps. We first use the first order conditions of the maximization problem of
the households to write the taxes rates as a function of the allocations. Then, we solve for the
optimal allocations after replacing the tax rates by these functions.
Following this approach, we first solve the maximization problem of each household. The
first order conditions of the maximization problem of household i imply
Ui1(t)
Ui2(t)
= Rt (1 + τ1t)1 + τ2t
, (8)
Ui2 (t)
Ui3(t)
= 1 + τ2t(1− τt) ei , (9)
Ui1(t)
pt (1 + τ1t)
= βRt
Ui1(t+ 1)
pt+1 (1 + τ1t+1)
. (10)
The notation Uij(t), j = 1, 2, 3, denotes the first derivative of U(c1it, c2it, 1− lit), for household
i at time t, with respect to the argument j. Equations (8)-(10) determine the tax rates as a
function of the allocations.
In the second step, we maximize (2) subject to the resource constraints (1), the budget
constraints and the cash-in-advance constraint of the household, substituting out the tax rates
from (8)-(10). To do this, we write the budget constraint of household i in its present value
form. This is obtained by multiplying condition (3) by Q0 and condition (4) for time t by Qt,
t = 1, 2, ... Adding the resulting inequalities implies
T−1∑
t=0
Qt+1pt (1 + τ1t) c1it +
T−1∑
t=0
Qt+1pt (1 + τ2t) c2it +
T−1∑
t=0
Qt+1 (Rt − 1)Mit (11)
−
T−1∑
t=0
Qt+1pt(1− τt)eilit −
T−1∑
t=0
Qt+1Zit +Qt (Mit +Bit) ≤Wi0,
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for T > 1. Using the no-Ponzi condition (5), this inequality implies
∞∑
t=0
Qt+1pt (1 + τ1t) c1it +
∞∑
t=0
Qt+1pt (1 + τ2t) c2it +
∞∑
t=0
Qt+1 (Rt − 1)Mit (12)
−
∞∑
t=0
Qt+1pt(1− τt)eilit −
∞∑
t=0
Qt+1Zit ≤Wi0.
At the optimum for household i, the intertemporal budget constraint holds with equality.
Assume that real transfers are time invariant, that is, Zit = pt (1 + τ2t) zi. Being time invariant
is not important for our results. What is important for our results is that transfers are not
taxed in the same way as labor income or purchases of consumption goods.4 With the
cash-in-advance constraint holding with equality, the intertemporal budget constraint can
then be rewritten as
∞∑
t=0
qt+1 (1 + τ1t)Rtc1it +
∞∑
t=0
qt+1 (1 + τ2t) c2it (13)
−
∞∑
t=0
qt+1(1− τt)eilit −
∞∑
t=0
qt+1 (1 + τ2t) zi =
Wi0
p0
,
where qt ≡ Qt pt−1
p0
. This equation is known in the literature as the implementability condition.
As is standard in the literature, we assume that the government is able to fully tax the initial
wealth of the households Wi0, but that this government revenue is not enough to pay for the
present value of public expenditures.5 As a result, it is necessary to raise additional government
revenues by resorting to distortionary taxation. Without loss of generality, therefore, we set
Wi0
p0
= 0.
Using the first order conditions, (8), (9) and (10), we can write (13) as
∞∑
t=0
βtUi1(t)c1it +
∞∑
t=0
βtUi2(t)c2it =
∞∑
t=0
βtUi3(t)eilit +
∞∑
t=0
βtUi2(t)zi, (14)
for i ∈ [0, 1].
For a vector (x˜it)i∈[0,1] ≡ (c1it, c2it, lit)i∈[0,1] that satisfies (14) and (1), it is always possible
4This condition is equivalent to Zit = pt (1 + τ1t)Rzi. Other alternatives for the evolution of the real
transfers would have different implications. We discuss this issue in section 4, where we allow another alternative
for real transfers.
5This can be done either with a tax over the initial wealth or by making the initial price level approaching
infinity (when Wi0 > 0).
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to find a policy ut that satisfies conditions (9), (8) and a price system vt that satisfies (10). This
policy ut and this price system vt, together with the allocation (xit)i∈[0,1] ≡ (x˜it,Mit, Bit)i∈[0,1],
where Mit satisfies (6) with equality and Bit satisfies (4), is a competitive equilibrium.
The Ramsey allocation problem is the vector (x˜it)i∈[0,1] that maximizes
∫ 1
0
ωi
∞∑
t=0
βtU(c1it, c2it, 1− lit)di, (15)
for weights ωi > 0, and satisfies the restrictions (14), one for each household i ∈ [0, 1], and
the resource constraint (1). Let λi and βtαt be the Lagrange multipliers associated with the
restrictions (14) and (1) respectively. The first order conditions of this problem are
Ui1(t) (ωi + λi) + λiUi11(t)cit + λiUi21(t)qit − λiUi21 (t) zi + αt = 0, (16)
Ui2(t) (ωi + λ) + λiUi12(t)cit + λiU22(t)qit − λiUi22 (t) zi + αt = 0, (17)
− Ui3(t) (ωi + λi) + λiUi33 (t) lit − eiαt = 0. (18)
We are now ready to prove the following proposition.
Proposition 1 If the utility function is additively separable in leisure and homogeneous in
consumption, and transfers are positive, then Ui1(t)Ui2(t) 6= 1. As the optimal effective tax over the
cash good, Rt (1 + τ1t), is different from the tax on the credit good, (1 + τ2t), then the optimal
commodity taxation is not uniform.
Proof. Since U is homogeneous in consumption, then
− Ui11(t)c1it + Ui21(t)c2it
Ui1(t)
= −Ui12(t)c1it + Ui22(t)c2i,t
Ui2(t)
≡ µ, (19)
where µ (6= 0) is a constant. From (16) and (17) we obtain
Ui1 (t)
Ui2 (t)
=
ωi + λi
(
1− µ− Ui22(t)ziUi2(t)
)
ωi + λi
(
1− µ− Ui21(t)ziUi1(t)
) , (20)
where λi 6= 0. With zi > 0, then Ui1(t)Ui2(t) 6= 1 as in general
Ui22(t)zi
Ui2(t) 6=
Ui21(t)zi
Ui1(t) .
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If z = 0, then the optimal allocation must be such that Ui1(t)Ui2(t) = 1. This is the standard
result. The optimal commodity taxation must be uniform. The effective consumption tax on
the two goods must be the same. The policy that implements this allocation must satisfy
condition (8), which implies Rt (1 + τ1t) = 1 + τ2t. There are many combinations of taxes and
nominal interest rates that satisfy this condition. However, if the tax on the cash good cannot
be different from the tax on the credit good, that is τ1t = τ2t, then the Friedman rule, Rt = 1,
is the only efficient policy.
With z > 0, optimal taxes are not uniform anymore because we have an extra term,
Ui22(t)zi. This term appears in the first order conditions because, by assumption and as we
usually observe in practice, transfers are not taxed. Transfers from the government are not
taxed either for political reasons or because they are intended to decrease inequality across
households.
3 Quantitative Results and Discussion
To calculate the quantitative implications of the model and discuss its results, we simplify some
aspects of the general economy above. Consider an economy with homogeneous households,
where ei = 1, and Wi0 =W0. All households have standard preferences given by
U (c1t, c2t, 1− lt) = c
1−θ
1t
1− θ + γ
c1−θ2t
1− θ + η
(1− lt)1−θ
1− θ , (21)
where θ, γ and η are positive constants.6 We follow the same notation. That is, c1t and c2t
denote the cash and credit goods at time t, respectively, and lt denotes hours of work at time t.
The parameter θ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The parameters γ and η determine
the relative weight on credit goods and leisure 1− lt, respectively.
We consider homogeneous households and the preferences in (21) to facilitate the dis-
cussion of our results. Moreover, the preferences in (21) constitute an important case. We
emphasize, however, that our results hold for heterogeneous households and for a general
utility function U (c1t, c2t, 1− lt) that satisfies the usual assumptions of concavity, separability,
and homogeneity.
6Tiago Cavalcanti suggested this functional form for the utility function.
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The first order conditions of the households’ problem imply equations (9)-(10), which yield
Rt =
1 + τ2t
1 + τ1t
1
γ
(
c2t
c1t
)θ
, (22)
1 + τ2t
1− τt =
γ
η
(1− lt
c2t
)θ
, (23)
1 + pit+1 = Rt
1 + τ1t
1 + τ1t+1
β
(
ct+1
ct
)−θ
, (24)
where pit+1 ≡ pt+1/pt − 1 is the inflation rate from period t to period t+ 1.
The resource constraint is now given by
c1t + c2t + g = lt, (25)
where we let gt = g to focus on a stationary equilibrium.
As we did in the previous section, we now solve the second utility maximization problem,
the Ramsey problem. The Ramsey problem is to obtain the allocation that maximizes (21)
subject to the resource constraint (25) and the implementability condition below, which
analogous to (14), with ei = 1 and without the subscript i,
∞∑
t=0
βtU1(t)c1t +
∞∑
t=0
βtU2(t)c2t =
∞∑
t=0
βtU3(t)lt +
∞∑
t=0
βtU2(t)z. (26)
Let λ and βtαt be the Lagrange multipliers respectively associated with (26) and (25). As the
objective function of this problem is concave, the Ramsey allocation must be stationary. That
is, in equilibrium, c1t = c1, c2t = c2, lt = l and αt = α.7 The first order conditions (16)-(18),
(26) and (25) imply the system of equations
1 + λ (1− θ) = αcθ1, (27)
1 + λ (1− θ) + λθ z
c2
= 1
γ
αcθ2, (28)
1 + λ+ λθ l1− l =
1
η
αt (1− l)θ , (29)
7This result is also a consequence of the fact that, in this formulation, zt = z and gt = g in the household
budget constraint.
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c1−θ1 + γc1−θ2 = η (1− l)−θ l + γc−θ2 z, (30)
c1 + c2 + g = l. (31)
The system (27)-(31) implies a set of five equations and five endogenous variables c1, c2, l,
α and λ. The solution to this problem is the Ramsey allocation for this economy. We retrieve
the optimal tax rates and interest rates using the first order conditions of the households’
problem, constraints (22)-(24).
This problem is useful to understand that z = 0 implies uniform taxation and the Friedman
rule, and that z > 0 implies a departure from the Friedman rule when it is not possible to set
different consumption taxes on the cash and credit goods. To obtain analytical expressions,
set γ = 1 and θ = 1. From equations (27) and (28), we obtain
c2
c1
= 1 + λ z
c2
. (32)
Moreover, tax rates and the gross interest rate must satisfy
R (1 + τ1)
1 + τ2
= c2
c1
, (33)
1 + τ2
1− τ =
1
η
(1− l
c2
)
, (34)
1 + pi = βR. (35)
Without loss of generality, equations (33)-(35) focus on the case with constant interest rate
and taxes.
Let z = 0. This is the case in which we have uniform taxation. From equation (32), we
obtain c2 = c1. Moreover,
R = 1 + τ21 + τ1
, (36)
1 + τ2
1− τ =
1
η
(1− l
c2
)
, (37)
1 + pi = βR. (38)
The system (36)-(38) is indeterminate as there are five endogenous variables (R, τ2, τ1, τ and
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pi), and three equations. However, if the tax rate on the cash good cannot be different from
the tax rate on the credit good, τ1 = τ2, then the Friedman rule, R = 1, is the unique solution
to the system.
Let now z > 0. Equation (32) then implies c2/c1 > 1, as λ > 0. We still have an
indeterminacy of the optimal taxes and interest rate from (33)-(35). However, from equation
(33), optimality now requires non-uniform taxation, R (1 + τ1) > 1 + τ2. Uniform taxation is
not optimal if transfers are positive.
Transfers are a pure rent and efficiency requires that they should be completely taxed,
that is, they should have an 100 percent tax rate. Since transfers cannot be taxed directly,
optimality requires that they should be taxed indirectly. This could be achieved with R = 1,
and by taxing more the cash good than the credit good, τ1 > τ2.
The Ramsey planner has an incentive to inflate above the level implied by the Friedman
rule as a way to levy an indirect tax on transfers. As Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2011) put
it, if we add a source of income, then the government is likely to depart from the Friedman
rule, if the instrument to tax that income is not available or if there is an upper limit on that
instrument tax rate.8
1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
%
 o
f G
DP
Social Benefits
Total
(a) Transfers
1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015
15
20
25
30
35
40
%
 o
f G
DP
Gov. Expenditures and Total Transfers
Gov. Expenditures and Social Benefits
Gov. Expenditures
(b) Gov. Expenditures and Transfers
Figure 1: Transfers and government expenditures over time. Social benefits are total federal transfers
of social benefits to persons (social security, medicare, veterans’ benefits and other transfers). Total
transfers include medicaid, state and local transfers, and transfers to the rest of the world. Shaded
areas indicate NBER U.S. recessions. Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
8This effect happens, for example, when the inflation tax is used to tax the underground economy (Nicolini
1998, Cavalcanti and Villamil 2003) or when the government has difficulties to enforce taxes (Arbex 2013).
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Suppose, for example, that the government cannot set different taxes for cash and credit
goods. In this case, τ1 = τ2.9 The government, for example, might not be able to distinguish
cash and credit goods. One of the reasons for the difficulty to distinguish cash and credit
goods is that the same good can be a cash good for some households and a credit good
for others. Households are heterogeneous and this implies different consumption choices.
Different consumption choices have implications with respect to the instruments used to
make transactions. Avery et al. (1987), Kennickell et al. (1997), Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin
(2000) and Attanasio et al. (2002), among others, point out that high-income households use
a smaller fraction of cash on their transactions than low-income households. The poorest
households do not own a checking account.10 The same good can be a cash good for a poor
household and a credit good for a rich household.
If the government is constrained to set τ1 = τ2, equation (33) implies
R > 1. (39)
The Friedman rule does not hold. As the government cannot set higher taxes for cash goods,
as it would be implied by equations (32)-(33), then the government needs to set R > 1 to
obtain the Ramsey policy. The cash good is taxed more than the credit good, but now this is
done through the inflation tax. This policy reaches the cash good because this good is subject
to the cash-in-advance constraint. From equation (38), we have pi > β − 1. The inflation rate
is higher than β− 1, which is the inflation rate implied by the Friedman rule. Although R > 1
when τ1 = τ2, the values of the consumption and labor taxes are still indeterminate. From
equation (37), the labor tax is obtained once a value for the consumption tax is chosen.
To determine the quantitative implications of our findings, we parameterize the model
based on US data and solve the system of equations (27)-(31) together with (33)-(35).
Figure 1 shows the evolution of transfers and government expenditures as a percentage
of GDP over time. Transfers increased substantially from 1947 to 2016. As stated in the
introduction, total government transfers payments during the period increased from 4.6
9It is common to assume the same tax rate for cash and credit goods. This is done, for example, in Cooley
and Hansen (1992).
10Erosa and Ventura (2002) find that expected inflation acts as a regressive consumption tax, increasing
inequality, as lower-income households tend to use more cash as a percentage of their total expenditures.
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Table 1: Parameters
Parameter Value
Intertemporal discount factor β 0.98
Coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) θ 1
Preference parameter on credit goods γ 1
Preference parameter on leisure η 4.213
The values of η, g and z are found simultaneously such that hours of work are equal to 0.3 when the transfers-
to-GDP ratio z/y is equal to 8 percent and the government-to-GDP ratio g/y is equal to 20 percent. For
θ = 0.5 and 2, η = 1.743 and η = 24.58 respectively. θ = 1 in figures 2 and 3. The value of g is maintained
constant during the simulations while the value of z increases from z = 0 to a value such that z/y = 15 percent.
percent of GDP to 15 percent of GDP. Federal government transfers as social benefits to
persons increased from 3.2 percent of GDP to 10.8 percent of GDP. In contrast, government
expenditures have a more stable behavior. Government expenditures changed from 16.5
percent of GDP in 1947 to 17.6 percent to 2016; the average for the whole period is 20.7
percent of GDP. As we show below, this change in the composition of transfers and government
expenditures has important consequences for optimal taxation.11
Table 2: Interest rates, inflation and labor taxes for different values for transfers
θ = 0.5 θ = 1 θ = 2
z R pi τl R pi τl R pi τl
(% of GDP) (% p.a.) (%) (% p.a.) (%) (% p.a.) (%)
0 1.000 −2.00 11.6 1.000 −2.00 13.4 1.000 −2.00 14.1
5 1.027 0.61 17.6 1.029 0.84 18.3 1.030 0.93 18.6
10 1.084 6.27 23.2 1.083 6.15 22.5 1.083 6.15 22.2
15 1.199 17.5 28.6 1.172 14.9 25.6 1.167 14.38 24.6
Gross interest rate R, inflation pi, and labor tax τl for different coefficients of relative risk aversion θ and
different levels of transfers z. Inflation in percent per annum. To determine τl, the consumption tax is set to
6.5% (τ1 = τ2). Parameters in table 1. Results obtained from equations (27)-(31) and (33)-(35).
We need to set values for the preferences parameters, government expenditures g, and
transfers z. We set β = 0.98 for the intertemporal discount, which implies a real interest rate
of 2 percent per year. The value of the weight on leisure η is determined so that hours of work
are equal to 0.3 when the ratio of government expenditures to GDP is equal to 20 percent
11Federal transfers of social benefits to persons include social security, medicare, veterans’ benefits, unem-
ployment insurance, and other transfers. Social security and medicare are about 70 percent of social benefits
since the mid 1960s. Veterans’ benefits decreased from 70 percent of social benefits in 1947 to 5 percent in
2016. Unemployment insurance from 2000 to 2016 is on average 4 percent of social benefits. Total government
transfers include federal social benefits, medicaid, state and local transfers, and transfers to the rest of the
world. Medicare and medicaid together comprise about 40 percent of total government transfers. Government
expenditures include consumption expenditures and gross investment. Data from the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis.
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and the ratio of transfers to GDP is equal to 8 percent. The ratio of g over GDP reflects
the mean of this variable since 1947. The value for transfers replicates the mean of the ratio
of federal transfers in the form of social benefits to persons over GDP since 1970. We set
γ = 1 so that cash and credit goods have an equal weight.12 We follow the same procedure to
obtain the parameters for θ = 0.5, 1, and 2. The value θ = 1 implies logarithmic utility. Once
we set the parameters, we calculate the optimal allocations and taxes for different values of z.
We change z so that the ratio of transfers to GDP to vary from zero to 15 percent. Table 1
shows the parameters used in the simulations.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Transfers (% of GDP)
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
: = -R ! 1
(a) Inflation (% per year)
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Transfers (% of GDP)
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
=l
=c = 5:0%
=c = 7:5%
=c = 10:0%
(b) Labor tax (%)
Figure 2: The Friedman rule holds for R = 1 or inflation equal to −2 percent per year. It holds when
transfers are equal to zero. Results from simulations. See table 1 for parameters. Transfers z increase
for a constant given value of government expenditures g.
Table 2 and figures 2 and 3 show the main results. Table 2 shows results for different
values of θ. Figures 2 and 3 show the results for additional variables and θ = 1. For z = 0, we
see that the Ramsey policy implies the Friedman rule, with R = 1 and inflation of −2 percent
per year. The consideration of positive transfers implies a substantial departure from the
Friedman rule. As transfers increase to 5 percent of GDP, the optimal policy for θ = 1 implies
R = 1.029 and pi = 0.8 percent per year. With transfers of 10 percent of GDP, the optimal
policy implies inflation of 6.15 percent per year. The values are robust to changes in θ.
The increase in transfers requires higher inflation and higher labor taxes. As leisure is
12Cooley and Hansen (1991, 1992) use γ = 1 and smaller values such as γ = 0.2. We also used these values
in the simulations and obtained results qualitatively similar.
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not taxed, hours of work decrease with higher transfers. To determine the optimal value
for the labor tax τl, we use equation (37) together with a value for the consumption tax, τc.
To obtain a value for the consumption tax, we use estimates for the effective tax rates on
consumption, as described by Mendoza et al. (1994).
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Figure 3: The Friedman rule (R = 1) holds when transfers are equal to zero. Total hours of work are
normalized to 1. Results from simulations. See table 1 for the parameters.
The calculations of effective tax rates take into account aggregate tax revenues from
consumption taxes and aggregate sales. In this way, a product with a high tax rate but low
demand would not be over represented if the consumption tax were calculated as an average
of the existing rates. Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994) find τc between 6.4 and 5.1 percent
for the US from 1965 to 1988, with smaller rates for the most recent periods. Silva (2008),
using a similar procedure, finds values for τc for the US between 5 percent and 7.1 percent for
1970-2001. Carey and Rabesona (2002), with a revised methodology, find values between 6.4
percent and 6.7 percent. The values, therefore, are largely compatible across estimates.
For table 2, we set τc = 6.5 percent and find τl = 22.5 percent, for θ = 1, when transfers
are 10 percent of GDP. The values for the labor tax are similar for different values of θ.
In figure 2, we calculate the optimal labor tax for τc = 5, 7.5 and 10 percent. For higher
consumption taxes, the required labor taxes are smaller. When transfers are 10 percent of
GDP, the optimal labor tax varies between 19.9 percent and 23.6 percent.
The main result of this section is that transfers have a significant impact on the estimates
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of optimal inflation in the standard cash-in-advance model with a credit good. The optimal
inflation reacts strongly to changes in the level of transfers. When transfers are zero the
optimal inflation rate is −2 percent, that is, equal to the negative of the real interest rate.
When transfers are 10 percent of GDP, which according to the data is a conservative value,
the optimal inflation is around 6 percent.
Our results were obtained assuming that the government maintains the real value of
transfers every period, taking into account the full tax on the consumption goods. This
assumption was made to simplify the analysis. In the next section, we investigate whether
results are robust to changes in this assumption.
4 Alternative Paths for Real Transfers
The optimal tax policy depends on the way transfers are introduced. There are two interesting
possibilities for the path of transfers, either real transfers adjusted for all taxes are time
invariant, i.e., Zit = pt (1 + τ2) zi, which is the assumption we have been using, or real transfers
adjusted only for the price level are constant, i.e., Zit = ptzi. We compare these two alternative
assumptions. It turns out that the labor income tax and the consumption tax are equivalent
instruments under the first assumption, but not under the second assumption. To study this
issue, we consider a version of the economy in section 2 with one consumption good instead
of two. Throughout, whenever possible, we keep the same notation.
There is a constant returns to scale technology that transforms units of efficiency into
output. Output can be used for private consumption of cash goods and public consumption.
The resource constraint is ∫ 1
0
citdi+ gt =
∫ 1
0
eilitdi. (40)
The private consumption good must be bought with money according to the standard
cash-in-advance constraint
pt (1 + τct) cit ≤Mit, (41)
where τct is the tax rate on the consumption good. The utility function of household i is given
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by
∞∑
t=0
βtU(cit, 1− lit), (42)
with 0 < β < 1. As before, we normalize total time to one; 1− li,t denotes leisure. Function
U is strictly concave and satisfies the Inada conditions.
The budget constraint of each household for the asset market at the beginning of time t is
given by
Mit +Bit ≤ Rt−1Bit−1 +Mit−1 − pt−1 (1 + τct−1) cit−1 + pt−1(1− τt−1)eilit−1 + Zit. (43)
Households are subject to the no-Ponzi condition (5).
The household i’s problem is to choose a vector (Mit, Bit, cit, lit)∞t=0 that maximizes (42)
subject to (43), (41), the no-Ponzi condition, and the initial conditions Wi0. The first-order
conditions of household i’s problem include
Ui1(t)
Ui2(t)
= Rt (1 + τct)(1− τt) ei , (44)
Ui1(t)
pt (1 + τct)
= βRt
Ui1(t+ 1)
pt+1 (1 + τct+1)
. (45)
The notation Uj(t), j = 1, 2 denotes the first derivative of U(cit, 1− lit) with respect to the
argument j.
The intertemporal budget constraint for the household i is
∞∑
t=0
qt+1 (1 + τc)Rcit =
Wi0
p0
+
∞∑
t=0
qt+1
(
Zit
pt
+ (1− τ)eilit
)
. (46)
An efficient way of raising government revenue is to tax the initial real wealth, as it is
equivalent to a lump-sum tax. Therefore, we assume that the initial real nominal wealth of
the household is fully taxed.13
As the utility function U is strictly concave by assumption and transfers and public
consumption are time invariant, then consumption and leisure are also time invariant. It
follows from (44) that time invariant consumption and leisure can be achieved with constant
13That can be done by making the initial price level extremely high or by having a 100 percent tax on the
initial wealth.
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tax rates and nominal interest rate. Thus, from now on, without loss of generality, we assume
that τct, τt, Rt are time invariant.14
Denote the path of transfers Zit = pt (1 + τc)Rzi as path A, and the path Zit = ptzi as
path B. The following lemma states that, in a cash in advance economy, the consumption tax,
the labor income tax and the nominal interest rate are equivalent instruments when the path
for the transfers follows path A.
Lemma 1 Assume that transfers follow path A. The policy vector (τac , τa, Ra) is equivalent
to the policy vector
(
τ bc , τ
b, Rb
)
where (1+τ
a
c )Ra
(1−τa) =
(1+τbc )Rb
(1−τb) .
Proof. When transfers follow path A and initial wealth is fully taxed, the budget constraint
for each household i can be written as
∞∑
t=0
qt+1
(1 + τc)R
(1− τ) cit =
∞∑
t=0
qt+1
((1 + τc)R
(1− τ) zi + eilit
)
. (47)
This constraint for the vector (τac , τa, Ra) is identical to the one for the vector
(
τ bc , τ
b, Rb
)
.
In the same way, the first order conditions are identical under the two alternative policies.
Given a path for government consumption and transfers, the equilibrium prices gross of taxes
are the same under the two policies. Moreover, aggregate and individual allocations are also
the same under the two policies. Therefore, the two policy vectors are equivalent.
We prove below that, when transfers follow path B, there is no equivalency between the
nominal interest rate and the labor tax rate, and that the optimal labor income tax is zero.15
First, it is convenient to write the budget constraint (46) of individual i with Zit = ptzi and
replace qt+1 using (45). We obtain
∞∑
t=0
βt (1 + τc)Rcit = Ψi +
∞∑
t=0
βt(1− τ)eilit, (48)
where Ψi =
∑∞
t=0 β
tzi. The variable Ψi is exogenous wealth of household i. Consider fiscal
policies of the type f = (τc, τ, R, L), where L is a virtual levy on Ψi. The virtual levy L on
the present value of transfers, defined as (1− L) Ψi, is equivalent to a lump-sum tax. The
next Lemma implies that the policy fa = (τac , τa, Ra, 0) is equivalent to the virtual policy
14To avoid confusion, we do not suppress the subscript t in cit and lit.
15In the appendix, we provide an alternative proof of this result.
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fav = (τavc , τav, Rav, L), where (1 + τavc )Rav = (1 + τac )Ra/φ, (1− τav) = (1− τa) /φ, and
1− L = 1/φ, with φ > 1.
Lemma 2 When transfers follow path B, the policy fa = (τac , τa, Ra, 0) is equivalent to
the virtual policy fav = (τavc , τav, Rav, L), where Rav = Ra/φ, (1− τav) = (1− τa) /φ, and
1− L = 1/φ.
Proof. When transfers follow path B the budget constraint (48) of household i, under
policy fa, is
∞∑
t=0
βt (1 + τac )Racit = Ψi +
∞∑
t=0
βt(1− τa)eilit. (49)
Dividing by φ, the budget constraint of household i becomes
∞∑
t=0
βt (1 + τavc )Ravcit = (1− L) Ψi +
∞∑
t=0
βt(1− τav)eihit. (50)
The individual first order conditions are identical under the two alternative policies. Given the
same path for government consumption and the same paths for the consumption-leisure pairs
of households, the resource constraint will be satisfied and, by Walras law, the government
budget constraint will also be satisfied. As a result, the equilibrium prices gross of taxes are
identical under fa or fav. Moreover, aggregate and individual allocations are the same under
the two policies.
We now establish that the inflation tax is a better instrument to finance government
transfers than the labor income tax. To simplify notation, let τc = 0.
Proposition 2 When transfers follow path B, the inflation tax is a more efficient instrument
than the labor income tax.
Proof. Suppose that there are two policies fa = (Ra, τa, 0) and f b =
(
Rb, τ b, 0
)
that
generate the same fiscal revenue necessary to finance the exogenous transfers, with Rb > Ra and
0 ≤ τ b < τa. Using Lemma 2, the policy fa is equivalent to the virtual policy fav = (1, τav, Lav)
and f b is equivalent to f bv =
(
1, τ bv, Lbv
)
. Since Rb > Ra, then Lbv > Lav. As the lump-sum
tax is larger under the virtual policy b, then τ bv < τav. Therefore, policy f b is more efficient
than policy fa as the same path of government transfers is financed with a lower distortionary
tax.
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If transfers follow path B and there are no constraints on the consumption tax, then
the labor income tax should be set to zero. The inflation tax and the consumption tax are
indeterminate. If there are active constraints on the consumption tax, either for political
reasons or because the inflation tax has lower administrative costs, then the Friedman rule is
not optimal.
5 Conclusions
The Friedman rule is one of the most robust results in the literature. Departures from the
Friedman rule in standard cash in advance models are associated with an incomplete set
of tax instruments. Typically, if there are sources of income or transactions of goods and
services that cannot be taxed, then the Friedman rule may cease to be optimal. For instance,
if prices are sticky and consumption taxes are not available (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2011),
if there are positive firms’ profits that cannot be taxed (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2004), or if
there is an underground economy where agents cannot be taxed (Nicolini 1998, Cavalcanti
and Villamil 2003, and Arbex 2013). Although in all these examples optimal seigniorage
is positive, they frequently imply insignificant levels of inflation. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2011) calibrate economies with these frictions to the US and conclude that each friction by
itself does not justify an inflation target above zero.
We investigate the implications of government transfers for the optimal rate of inflation.
Surprisingly, we find that, unlike public consumption, the apparently innocuous introduction
of government transfers changes the standard optimal taxation result of uniform taxation.
As transfers cannot be taxed, a positive nominal net interest rate is the indirect way for the
government to tax transfers. The higher the transfers, the higher is the optimal inflation rate.
We calibrate a model with homogeneous households and transfers to the US economy. We
obtain optimal values for inflation that are substantially higher than the ones obtained in the
literature when other frictions are considered.
The model abstracts from the fact that households are asymmetric with respect to wealth
and income and, as such, does not take into account the empirical distribution of transfers
across households. A model and a calibration that allow for these asymmetries could imply
different estimates, with possibly lower levels for the optimal inflation rate. Nevertheless,
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the exercise shows that the presence of transfers has the potential to justify the targets for
inflation of the order of magnitude of the targets followed by central banks.16
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A Appendix
We provide an alternative proof to proposition 2 of section 4.
Proposition 2 When transfers follow path B, the inflation tax is a more efficient instrument
than the labor income tax.
Proof. Consider the simple economy of section 4 with the path of transfers following
path B, ei = 1, g = 0, and τc = 0. Define Γt ≡ 11−τt and ct ≡ f (ΓtRt) as the value of
consumption that solves equations (40) and (44). Define the instantaneous indirect utility as
V (ΓtRt) ≡ U(f (ΓtRt) , 1− f (ΓtRt)), using the fact that ct = lt. Since U is stricly concave,
the optimal allocation is stationary, which implies that Γt and Rt should be stationary too.
It is trivial to see that V is decreasing in ΓR. Therefore, the optimal tax policy solves the
25
problem minΓ,R ΓR subject to the government budget constraint
ΓR− 1
Γ f (ΓR) = z. (A.1)
Suppose that τ > 0, and so Γ(τ,R) ≡ 11−τ > 1, and that Γ and R satisfy (A.1). We then
show that it is always possible to decrease Γ ≥ 1 and increase R so that ΓR decreases, but
the constraint (A.1) is still satisfied. As a result, the solution of the problem cannot involve
Γ > 1. First, a change in Γ together with a change in R so that dΓdR = − ΓR maintains the
value of ΓR constant. Consider an increase in R, dR > 0. If Γ changes by dΓ = − ΓRdR− ε,
for ε > 0, then, as d (ΓR) = ΓdR + RdΓ, this change in Γ and R implies a change in
ΓR equal to −Rε < 0. On the other hand, dΓ and dR changes government revenues by
( 1Γ2 f (ΓR) +
ΓR−1
Γ f
′ (ΓR)R)dΓ + (f (ΓR) + (ΓR− 1) f ′ (ΓR))dR. With dΓ = − ΓRdR− ε, this
change in government revenues is equal to
(
1− 1ΓR
)
f (ΓR) dR−
( 1
Γ2 f (ΓR) +
ΓR− 1
Γ f
′ (ΓR)R
)
ε. (A.2)
As ΓR > 1 and f (ΓR) > 0, the coefficient on dR is strictly positive. Therefore, for any
dR > 0, there is a sufficiently small ε > 0 such that the expression in (A.2) is positive. This
means that ΓR decreases but government revenues increase. We then have that a pair (Γ, R),
with Γ > 1, cannot be the solution to the Ramsey problem as there is a decrease in the labor
tax rate and an increase in the nominal interest rate such that the distortion ΓR decreases
and government revenues do not decrease. It follows that the solution to the Ramsey problem
requires Γ∗ = 1. Moreover, setting Γ∗ = 1 in (A.1) implies that R∗ is equal to the smallest
value that satisfies (R− 1) f (R) = z. As Γ = 11−τ and z > 0, then τ = 0 and R > 1.
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